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COBRA: Congress Provides Partial
Protection Against Employer
Termination of Retiree Health
Insurancet
DAVID L. GREGORY*
Congress recently passed the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act (COBRA) providing protection for employees
against the unilateral abrogation of retiree participation in an em-
ployer's group health insurance plan. Though COBRA provides
significant inroads for employees, it is not a panacea. This Article
examines COBRA, its mechanics, and its shortcomings. This Arti-
cle also analyzes pre-COBRA judicial decisions relating to retiree
health benefits in both the unionized and nonunionized settings
and addresses the public policy considerations for the need to fur-
ther strengthen legal protections for America's aging workforce.
INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, in the landmark case of Allied Chemical Work-
ers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.," the Supreme Court held that re-
tirees were not "employees" within the meaning of the National La-
bor Relations Act (NLRA).2 Because retirement benefits for current
retirees are not mandatory subjects of bargaining within the mean-
t Copyright 1986, by David L. Gregory.
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. LL.M. 1982, Yale Uni-
versity; J.D. magna cum laude, 1980, University of Detroit; M.B.A. 1977, Wayne State
University; B.A. with honors, 1973, Catholic University of America. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the meticulous research assistance of Mitchell Rait, .. D. 1987, St.
John's University; B.S. 1984, New York University.
1. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
2. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1982) [hereinafter NLRA].
January/February Vol. 24 No. 1
ing of the NLRA,3 the union can neither bargain to impasse nor
strike over the benefits provided to current retirees.' In 1974, after
more than a decade of study,5 Congress passed the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) . Primarily designed to protect
private sector employees from losing pension rights after long years
of service,7 ERISA set more realistic vesting provisions based on age
3. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
4. See Fanning, Commentary: Private Pension and Welfare Plans - The Role
of the NLRB, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1527 (1972).
5. In 1962 President Kennedy created a presidential task force to study national
pension problems. Although no remedial legislation was immediately forthcoming, the
task force recommended federal legislation to require realistic vesting standards and fidu-
ciary duties to protect private pension plan beneficiaries. 120 CONG. REc. 29934 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4843. In 1967 Senator
Javitz of New York, the primary architect of ERISA, introduced a comprehensive pri-
vate pension reform bill. Id. For other similar bills introduced in the late sixties and early
seventies, see S. 2167, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
H.R. 1045, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 3421, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R.
11884, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Most of these proposed bills likewise would have
liberalized and lowered vesting provisions and would have strengthened fiduciary duties.
For summaries of these pre-ERISA legislative proposals, see Levin, Proposals to Elimi-
nate Inequitable Loss of Pension Benefits, 15 VILL. L. REV. 527 (1970); Note, A Reap-
praisal of the Private Pension System, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 278 (1972).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
7. See Note, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies
and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 539, 562 (1975):
In 1973, the Senate Finance Committee concluded that only one out of every
three employees participating in employer-financed plans had a 50 percent or
greater vested right to accrued benefits. Fifty-eight percent of all employees
between the ages of 50 and 60, and 54 percent of those 60 years and older,
lacked vested rights to one-half of their accrued benefits. Moreover, the Senate
Labor Sub-Committee found that out of almost 1,500 private pension plans,
approximately 13 percent contained no provisions whatsoever for vesting of
benefits prior to retirement. In plans which lacked pre-retirement vesting, an
employee could conceivably work for 40 years, be fired one day prior to retire-
ment, and thereby forfeit all rights to benefits accrued during his working
career.
Many graphic instances of employees with long service deprived of their pension bene-
fits are found in ERISA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974 212-14:
'Perhaps the most noted example involves the closing of the Studebaker
plant in South-Bend, Ind., in 1964 and the accompanying termination of its
pension plan. Even though this was a liberal plan which called for the system-
atic funding of liabilities . . . 4,000 vested employees between the ages of 40
and 60 had received only 15 percent of their anticipated benefits . . . some
2,900 employees under the age of 40, some of whom were vested, were left with
absolutely nothing.' When Studebaker closed its plant in 1965, the Studebaker
employees lost $14 million, eighty-five percent of the current value of their
vested benefits. Although the plan was able to pay those who had already re-
tired, their then-current 1964-65 work force lost from 40 to 100% of its
pensions.
See also Chadwick & Foster, Federal Regulation of Retirement Plans: The Quest for
Parity, 28 VAND. L. REV. 641, 668-69 n.196 (1975). The Studebaker collapse was the
single most notorious and devastating incident spurring comprehensive pension law
reform.
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and service,8 strengthened fiduciary duties of pension plan adminis-
trators, 9 mandated minimum funding requirements10 and pension
plan insurance," and provided effective remedies. 12 Although
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1982). Prior to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, an employee could vest a nonforfeitable right to 100% of the employer's pension
contribution in as little as 10 years of service. That period has been shortened to five
years under the new legislation. Section 1113 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 amends
sections 410(a) and 411(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, and sections 1012 of ERISA,
to require more rapid vesting in accrued benefits, effective for plan years beginning after
December 31, 1988. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1113 (a)-(b), (e),
55 U.S.L.W. 1 (1986). However, for plans maintained pursuant to collective bargaining
agreements which were ratified before March 1, 1986, the new provision will not be
effective for years beginning before the earlier of (1) the latter of January 1, 1989 or the
termination of the collective bargaining agreement, or (2) January 1, 1991. Id. 8
1113(e).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982). ERISA fiduciary duties are comprehensive,
meticulously applied, and sweeping in both the scope of fiduciary liability and in the
nature of prohibited transactions. See Little & Thailkill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A
Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1977); Osborne, The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act and Fiduciary Responsibility, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 298 (1976).
10. Although no employer is required to have a pension plan, all ERISA pension
plans are subject to minimum funding requirements. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1982).
The core provisions are:
(2) For a plan year, the funding standard account shall be charged with the sum of -
(A) the normal cost of the plan for the plan year;
(B) the amounts necessary to amortize in equal annual installments (until fully
amortized) -
(i) in the case of a plan in existence on January 1, 1974, the unfunded past
service liability under the plan on the first day of the first plan year to which
this part applies, over a period of 40 plan years,
(ii) in the case of a plan which comes into existence after January 1, 1974...
over a period of 30 years.
In 1984 the Bureau of Labor Statistics studied 1499 medium and large firm pension
plans, statistically representing 21 million employees in 45,000 firms. Employees retiring
January 1, 1984 at age 65 after 30 years of service would receive monthly pensions
averaging from $385 for those earning $15,000 in 1983 to $886 for those earning
$40,000. Twenty year service retirees at the same salary levels would receive monthly
pensions from $263 to $623. Ten year employees earning $15,000 in 1983 would receive
$137 per month; 40 year employees earning $40,000 in 1983 would receive $1075.
ERISA pension amounts would be further bolstered by Social Security benefits. Schmitt,
Today's Pension Plans: How Much Do They Pay?, MONTHLY LAB. REV. Dec. 1985, at
19-20.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1453 (1982). The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) within the Department of Labor provides for the "timely and uninterrupted
payment of pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries" if an ERISA pension plan
fails. ERISA pension plans must be insured against failure, and must reimburse the
PBGC for any losses. See Nicholson, Collections and Settlement Under ERISA, 29 LAB.
L.J. 364 (1978). The PBGC protects pensions of 30 million workers in 110,000 plans,
with a current liability over $1.3 billion. The Reagan Administration has proposed turn-
ing private pension plans over to private insurers and dismantling the PBGC. See Pean,
U.S. Seeks to Cut Role In Insuring Pension Benefits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1986, at Al,
col. 1.
12. ERISA provides for minimal penalties of one year imprisonment, fines from
ERISA did not require employers to provide pension plans to their
employees, the law substantially improved safeguards for those em-
ployees for whom private pension plans were voluntarily provided.13
Unfortunately, despite ERISA's enhanced protections of pension
benefits, retiree health insurance was not similarly safeguarded.
ERISA did not require that the future liability for employer-paid
health insurance benefits be funded or be provided or continued upon
retirement. Thus, neither the cornerstone of federal labor law, the
NLRA, nor the major pension protection law, ERISA, offers direct
statutory protection for the health insurance benefits of retired work-
ers. By both narrow case law construction of the parties' "intent" viajudicial scrutiny of the pertinent documents, and by legislative fail-
ure, retiree health insurance was consigned to legal limbo. As this
dangerous vacuum in the law became increasingly obvious in the
early eighties, Congress was finally compelled to provide retirees
some initial partial protection for continued participation in em-
ployer provided health insurance group plans. At long last, Congress
constrained the previously untrammeled employer prerogative of uni-
lateral abrogation of retiree participation in the employer's group
health insurance plan. In April 1986, Congress passed the Consoli-
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA).14 The CO-
BRA provisions regarding the new continuation coverage require-
ments of group health insurance plans are implemented by
COBRA's amendments of the Internal Revenue Code and of
ERISA.
This Article will first summarize and assess these new statutory
protections. COBRA is a very modest, but nevertheless potentially
significant, legislative first step toward rectifying the incongruity and
injustice of leaving the continuance of retired workers' health insur-
ance benefits to the unbridled discretion of the employer. Unilateral
employer authority to abrogate the economic terms of retirement is
eerily analogous to the employer's former unilateral ability to like-
wise abrogate collective bargaining agreements during business reor-
ganization under the Bankruptcy Code. 15 The Article will then ex-
$5000 (individuals) to $100,000 (corporations), and broad civil remedies. 29 U.S.C. §
1131 (1982). Actions may be brought by participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries and/or
the Secretary of Labor under a variety of circumstances. Id. § 1132.
13. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 4639, 4643.
14. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, 100 Stat. 222 (1986). For further analysis, see Weckstein, The Problematic Provi-
sion and Protection of Health and Welfare Benefits for Retirees, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
101 (1987), in this issue.
15. In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the employer's unilateral right to abrogate its collective bargaining
agreements upon the commencement of chapter 11 reorganization pursuant to the Bank-
ruptcy Code of 1978. The most controversial subpart of the Bildisco decision, narrowly
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amine the pertinent case law in the federal circuit courts, developed
in both unionized and nonunionized environments prior to the CO-
BRA statute. The pre-COBRA case law usually hinged upon judi-
cial assessment of the intent of the parties, without enunciating
broad policy.
In conclusion, the Article assesses the policy implications for fur-
ther strengthening legal protections for retiree health benefits. With
increasingly interlocking international markets and the aging of
America's post-World War II baby boom work force, this vitally im-
portant issue promises to become even more significant as we fast
approach the next century.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION: THE CONSOLIDATED OMNIBUS BUDGET
RECONCILIATION ACT (COBRA)
By the mid-eighties, Fortune 500 companies had an estimated lia-
bility of over two trillion dollars for retiree health care benefits, with
only $1.3 trillion in funded corresponding assets.1 6 These largely un-
adopted by a 5-4 vote of the Court, allowed the employer to terminate its labor contract
without first bargaining with the union and without first securing the approval of the
bankruptcy court. In June 1984 Congress legislatively overruled these most controversial
elements of the Bildisco decision. By passage of 11 U.S.C. § 1113, part of the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Congress now requires the em-
ployer to first bargain in good faith with the union and to secure the approval of the
bankruptcy court prior to employer abrogation of labor contracts in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. For discussion of the Bildisco decision and the 11 U.S.C. § 1113 legislative re-
sponse, see Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme Court's
Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C.L. REV. 539 (1984); Gregory, Legal Devel-
opments Since NLRB v. Bildisco: Partial Resolution of Problems Surrounding Labor
Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy, 62 DEN. L. REV. 615 (1985); Gregory, The Congres-
sional Response to NLRB v. Bildisco and the Constitutional Subtleties of the Nondele-
gation Doctrine, 62 U. DET. L. REv. 245 (1985); Haggard, The Continuing Conflict Be-
tween Bankruptcy and Labor Law - The Issues That Bildisco and the 1984 Bankruptcy
Amendments Did Not Resolve, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1; West, Life After Bildisco: Section
1113 and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 65 (1986); Note, Labor
Law-Bankruptcy-Collective Bargaining Agreements and Chapter If Reorganizations
Under Subtitle J of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
59 TUL. L. REV. 1604 (1985); Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Bankruptcy: NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco and the Legislative Response, 33 CATH. U.L.
REV. 943 (1984); Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements Under the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments of 1984, 71 VA. L. REV. 983 (1985). For important case law con-
struction of the section 1113 standards now governing labor contract rejection in bank-
ruptcy, see Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d
Cir. 1986); Century Brass Prod., Inc. v. United Auto Workers, 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 433 (1986); In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 Bankr. 403
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
16. Barnes & Mishkind, Retiree Health and Welfare Benefits; Controversy Over
Their Duration, 10 EMP. REL. L.J. 584 (1985); Stewart & Kelly, Insurance Premiums
for Retirees After the Union Contract Expires, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 521 (1983); Bittman &
funded benefits were not directly protected by ERISA. No funding
or reserve requirement was imposed. The benefits could be termi-
nated at the discretion of the employer, absent contractual protec-
tions. Unilateral employer reductions and terminations of retiree
health care plans signaled an impending crisis.1 7 In 1984 the House
Committee on Aging began hearings on the perilous status of retiree
health care. 8 Through the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,19 Con-
Peve, Health Plans May Leave Retirees Out in the Cold, Bus. WK., Dec. 17, 1984, at
105; English, Who'll Pay For Retirees Health Plans?, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct.
21, 1985, at 72.
17. Although beyond the purview of this immediate Article, a very important un-
resolved related problem involves unilateral employer termination of ERISA pension
plans. With the strong equity market since Fall 1985, many institutional pension plans
are now overfunded. ERISA permits the employer sponsor to terminate the pension plan,
with all fund surplus assets reverting to the sole use of the employer.
In early 1986, United Auto Workers estimated that pension reversions from 1980-1985
totalled $3.9 billion. In 1985 the single largest reversion, $962 million, occurred at
United Airlines, which used the surplus pension funds for "corporate expansion." Cohn,
The Pension Powder Keg, Newsweek, Feb. 10 1986, at 63; see also Friedman, Raiding
Retirement Funds is Piracy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1986 at 2F, col. 1:
Tempted by overflowing returns on stock in their pension plans, more than
1000 companies have recently siphoned off $12 billion in pension fund assets
meant for workers and retirees. The corporations then used the funds to fuel
scores of ventures completely unrelated to the employees on whose behalf the
plan was established. . . . Clever financial officers discovered a loophole in the
[ERISA] law: All they had to do was stop the plan and pay benefits earned up
to that point. Then a company could grab what was left - the so-called sur-
plus assets.
But see Klein, Without Reversion, Business Won't Play, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1986, at
2F, col. 1:
In fact, few companies employ the reversion practice. Of the hundreds of
thousands of plans in existence between 1980 and 1985, there were only 938
pension plan terminations with reversions in excess of $1 million.
More important, there is little evidence that employees experience dimin-
ished benefits following a termination/reversion. The Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, a quasi-governmental entity that insures the payment of pension
benefits, reports that in 70 percent of the cases where a termination/reversion
occurred, the employer established a new defined benefit plan. In 15 percent of
the cases, the employer established another type of successor pension plan, such
as a defined contribution plan. In only 15 percent of the cases was no new plan
created. In virtually all of those cases it is safe to conclude that the employer
either used the excess assets to keep an ailing company afloat and its workers
employed, or ceased operations altogether. Permitting employers to reclaim ex-
cess pension assets has been a well-established policy since 1983 when Con-
gress recognized that it was necessary to encourage employers to establish such
plans and to fund them adequately. Permitting reversions allows an employer
to justify generous funding without fear that accumulated assets will be irrevo-
cably lost.
For further commentary on the debate regarding reversion of surplus funds to the
employer following its unilateral termination of pension plans, see Lilly, The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 35 LAB. L.J. 603 (1984).
18. State of the Elderly: The Financial Burden of Health Care, 1984: Hearings
Before the House Select Committee on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 429 (1984); see also
Senate Committee on Aging Criticizes Lack of Protection for Retiree Health and Life
Insurance Benefits, BNA Daily Report for Executives, Aug. 4, 1986, at A-2.
19. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984)
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gress limited the tax deductions that employers could take for all
funded welfare benefit plans, 20 and also limited the reserves that
could be held to pay for health and other benefits.21 In the first ma-
jor state law, Massachusetts required guaranteed continuance of
health insurance benefits for one month by employers who had re-
ceived state funds.22
Congress passed COBRA in April 1986.23 Prior to COBRA, when
employees lost their jobs, they and their families and dependents
usually suffered simultaneous loss of employer provided health care
insurance. Retirees were also at the mercy of their employer as to
whether they could continue to participate in the employer's group
health insurance plan, absent contractually binding, vested,
nonterminable protections. In 1985 thirty-seven million Americans
had no health insurance, a forty-two percent increase since 1980.24
Through COBRA, effective July 1, 1986,25 "covered" 26 employees
who lose their job or have their hours reduced27 for other than gross
misconduct,2 8 have the statutory right to remain included in their
former employer's group health insurance plan for at least eighteen
months.29 Spouses and dependent children deemed the "qualified
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1).
20. Id. § 419(5), 98 Stat. at 854-56.
21. Id. § 419A(5), 98 Stat. at 856-61.
22. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § IIOD (Law. Coop. Supp. 1986). Section 110D,
entitled "Coverage to Continue for Certain Period After Insured Leaves Group,"
provides:
Every policy of insurance issued after January first, nineteen hundred and
sixty-eight under the provisions of section one hundred and ten shall contain a
provision that, in the event that the insured person leaves the group covered by
such insurance, said person shall remain insured under such policy for a period
of thirty-one days thereafter unless, during such period, he shall otherwise be
entitled to similar benefits.
23. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, 100 Stat. 222 (1986) [hereinafter COBRA].
24. Saunders, Cobra's Bite, Forbes, July 14, 1986, at 84.
25. COBRA, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 222 (1986). In the case of a group
health plan maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, COBRA will not
apply until the expiration of the governing collective bargaining agreement, or January 1,
1987, whichever is later. Id. § 10001 (e)(2), 100 Stat. at 227.
26. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(7)(A), 100 Stat. at 226: "The term 'covered employee'
means an employee who is (or was) provided coverage under a group health plan by
virture of the individual's employment or previous employment with an employer."
27. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(3), 100 Stat. at 224: "The term 'qualifying event' means
(B) The termination (other than by reason of such employee's gross misconduct) or
reduction of hours, of the covered employee's employment."
28. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(3)(B), 100 Stat. at 224. See supra note 27.
29. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(2)(B)(i)(I), 100 Stat. at 224.
beneficiaries" 3 of "covered" employees, may be included for up to
thirty-six months following termination of the covered employee'sjob.31 By including retirees within COBRA's definition of the "cov-
ered employee," they are also eligible to participate in the former
employer's group health insurance plan for eighteen months follow-
ing retirement.3 2 For purposes of protecting health insurance cover-
age, COBRA statutorily equated retirees with employees, and miti-
gated the harsh impact of Pittsburgh Plate Glass.
Each covered employee and spouse must be provided written no-
tice of their rights at the time of commencement of coverage under
the group health plan.3 3 Following a qualifying event, typically the
termination of employment, the covered employee, retiree, and quali-
fied beneficiary have a minimum period of sixty days to elect to par-
ticipate in continued coverage under the employer's group health in-
surance plan." Coverage cannot be conditioned upon, or
discriminate on the basis of, lack of evidence of insurability.3 5 How-
ever, both qualified beneficiaries and covered employees electing to
continue coverage under the employer's group plan must do so en-
tirely at their own expense.3 6 In fact, COBRA permits the employer
to charge a 2% surcharge above the 100% applicable premium for
those electing continuing coverage.37 This 102% premium, via the
2% surcharge, is designed to reimburse the employer for related
paperwork and administrative expenses.
Even if one elects to pay the premium in monthly installments, 8
the cost can be potentially prohibitive. Comprehensive family health
insurance, with good hospitalization and dental coverage, has an an-
nual premium of approximately $2000; comparable individual cover-
age in an employer's group plan costs approximately $1000. 39
Nevertheless, those electing to remain group plan beneficiaries,
even after fully absorbing the full 102% premium, will still benefit.
Participation in the employer's group plan generally allows the indi-
vidual beneficiary to obtain higher quality, more comprehensive, and
less expensive insurance coverage than would otherwise be available
30. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(7)(B)(i), 100 Stat. at 226-27: "The term 'qualified benefi-
ciary' means with respect to a covered employee under a group health plan, any other
individual who, on the day before the qualifying event for that employee, is a beneficiary
under the plan - (I) as the spouse of the covered employee, or (II) as the dependent
child of the employee."
31. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(2)(B)(i)(II), 100 Stat. at 224.
32. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(7)(A), 100 Stat. at 226; see supra note 26.
33. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(6), 100 Stat. at 226.
34. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(5), 100 Stat. at 225-26.
35. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(2)(D), 100 Stat. at 224.
36. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(2)(C), 100 Stat. at 224.
37. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(2)(C)(i), 100 Stat. at 224.
38. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(2)(C)(ii), 100 Stat. at 224.
39. Saunders, supra note 24, at 84.
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to the individual outside the aegis of the employer's preferential
group rate. 0
Prior to the expiration of the maximum statutory period of contin-
ued coverage, which is generally eighteen months for terminated em-
ployees and retirees, 41 eligibility for continued coverage will cease
upon failure to pay the premium,42 reemployment under another
group health plan, 43 entitlement to Medicare eligibility under title
XVIII of the Social Security Act,44 or remarriage of the qualified
beneficiary spouse of the covered employee, when the spouse be-
comes covered under a group health plan by virtue of remarriage.4 5
If the employer violates COBRA by unlawfully refusing continued
coverage in its group plan to eligible individuals, the federal tax con-
sequences for both the corporate employer and its senior executives
can be quite adverse. COBRA will be enforced through the federal
tax law. For example, an employer's unlawful refusal to continue
health plan coverage will result in loss of the company's entire tax
deduction for its cost of medical insurance covering all of its employ-
ees, 4 6 via COBRA's amendment of section 162 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.4 7 Further, if the company loses its tax deduction, the com-
pany's highly compensated executives are a!so penalized; COBRA
mandates the Internal Revenue Service to treat company-paid health
insurance premiums for executives as personal individual income
subject to income tax.4
Despite these expanded protections for continued health plan in-
surance and effective sanctions for violations, COBRA is neverthe-
less only a first step toward comprehensive safeguards against unilat-
eral employer termination of health insurance benefits. There are
significant express exceptions in the law, as well as other major
problems, that COBRA does not address.
COBRA is limited to firms with twenty or more employees. 9 In
40. "But it is easily worth the price to the beneficiary, who couldn't otherwise
obtain the same quality of coverage for anything like that price. Cobra's provisions, says
Avery Newmark, Ernst & Whinney's benefits expert, 'give people time to get their feet
on the ground'." Id.
41. COBRA, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 10001(c)(k)(2)(B)(i), 100 Stat. 222, 224
(1986).
42. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(2)(B)(iii), 100 Stat. at 224.
43. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(2)(B)(iv)(I), 100 Stat. at 224.
44. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(2)(B)(iv)(II), 100 Stat. at 224.
45. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(2)(B)(v), 100 Stat. at 224.
46. Id. § 10001(a)(2)(A), 100 Stat. at 222-23.
47. Id. § 10001(a), 100 Stat. at 222-23.
48. Id. § 10001(b)(1), 100 Stat. at 223.
49. Id. § 10001(b)(b)(2)(1), 100 Stat. at 223 (amending I.R.C. § 106); id. §
addition, church plans, 50 and the federal government 1 as an em-
ployer are excluded from COBRA. Most ominously, if the employer
"ceases to provide any group health care plan to any employee," 52
COBRA offers no protection. The employer can terminate all group
health plans for all employees without threat of COBRA sanctions.
Perhaps the unilateral prerogatives of the employer have been only
marginally constrained by COBRA. If the employer is forced to re-
organize or liquidate in bankruptcy and thus terminates all group
health plans, COBRA permits such conduct.
Even under the norm of continuing coverage, COBRA provides
retirees with continuation of coverage in the employer's group health
plan for a maximum of only eighteen months after the termination
of employment. When retired for more than eighteen months, the
retiree can be summarily denied continued participation in the group
health plan. Deprived of the preferential lower group rate just when
health care becomes an increasingly important concern, the retired
employee can still be faced with the untenable choice of personal
bankruptcy by the cost of catastrophic illness, or paying prohibitively
expensive individual health insurance premiums. Ultimately, the
cruel dilemma faced by the retiree may be whether penury will be
realized through a single major illness, or by the interminable eco-
nomic torture of ineluctably escalating individual rate premiums.
Thus, once retired for more than COBRA's limited eighteen months
of protection, the retiree can still be consigned to destitution. Admit-
tedly, COBRA does offer the retiree some relative protections from
unilateral employer termination of group health insurance for the
first eighteen months of retirement. COBRA, despite its many obvi-
ous deficiencies, is an improvement over the pre-COBRA period
when retirees had no viable statutory protection of group health in-
surance continuance. COBRA marks a first step toward possible fu-
ture comprehensive statutory protection of post-employment health
care benefits for retirees. Because of both its present safeguards and
its potential promise for future statutory improvements, the COBRA
legislation is, at least on the margin, an improvement over the for-
mer statutory vacuum. It is an important complement to the dubious
protections previously afforded only via employer largess, private
contract terms, or some collective bargaining agreements.
10002(a), 100 Stat. at 227 (amending ERISA § 601(b)).
50. Id. § 10001(b)(b)(2)(c), 100 Stat. at 223.
51. Id. § 10001(b)(b)(2)(B), 100 Stat. at 223.
52. Id. § 10001(c)(k)(2)(ii), 100 Stat. at 224.
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PRE-COBRA CASE LAW REGARDING RETIREE HEALTH
INSURANCE
The Role of the Collective Bargaining Agreement in the Judicial
Determination of the Status of Retiree Health Insurance Benefits
Although current retiree benefits are not mandatory subjects of
bargaining," they are permissive and lawful.54 If the union has suffi-
cient negotiating leverage and if the employer is amenable, retiree
benefits can certainly be negotiated into the collective bargaining
agreement.55 The union can also negotiate to impasse or to an agree-
ment over the mandatory terms of the future retirement benefits of
current employees who have not yet retired.56 These avenues present
a variety of viable strategies by which a union can successfully nego-
tiate retirement health insurance provisions into the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
When a collective bargaining agreement is present, it will usually
be the court's primary point of reference. Often, the terms of the
labor contract will prove dispositive in resolving the legal status of
retiree health insurance benefits. Essentially, the courts must ascer-
tain whether retiree health insurance is addressed by the contract. If
the contract is express and affirmative, regarding the intent and un-
derstanding of the parties, the resolution is unproblematic. However,
when the contract is unclear or silent, the courts have not uniformly
found either a terminable or interminable right. In the absence of
express contractual terms, the courts must ascertain and infer the
intent of the parties by looking at the contract language and the
relationship of the parties considered as a whole. This is obviously a
difficult judicial exercise under any circumstance.
When the collective bargaining agreement has expired, the judi-
cial inquiry into the intent of the parties regarding the status of re-
tiree benefits becomes especially complicated. Courts have generally
placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff; correspondingly, the judi-
cial assumption is one of nonvested rights. It is possible for courts to
hold that because contract benefits are so crucial, the parties could
not have intended that they evaporate with the expiration of the con-
tract, and thus they continue beyond the expiration of the labor
53. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. I v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass, Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
54. Id. at 181-82.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 180.
agreement.57 However, it is equally possible for courts to conclude
that the retiree health insurance rights simply do not survive the ex-piration of the collective bargaining agreement; if the parties hadintended vested nonterminable benefits, they would have so provided.
This latter position is especially bolstered by the general legal pre-
sumption that future retirement expectations are not vested rights.
Given these various contractual possibilities and the absence of a
uniform federal labor law policy in the federal courts, it is not sur-prising that the pre-COBRA case law reflects this entire spectrum ofpossibilities regarding the contractual status of retiree health insur-
ance benefits. The Sixth Circuit has provided the most interesting
and influential pre-COBRA decisions.
In United Auto Workers v. Yard-Man, Inc.,58 for example, thedistrict court held that the employer unlawfully terminated thehealth and life insurance benefits of its retirees upon the expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement. Relying upon the language of
the contract, the district court deemed the employer's purported can-
cellation of retiree benefits a breach of the labor agreement. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The court of appeals began its analysis by highlighting the pivotalimportance of the intent of the parties. " The court reiterated the
axiom that the parties may contractually provide for retiree benefits
which survive the expiration of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.60 If this was the intent of the parties, the court expressly
stated that "any such surviving benefit must necessarily find its gen-
esis in the collective bargaining agreement."6 1
The Sixth Circuit outlined the basic principles of contractual in-
terpretation to ascertain the intent of the parties in the collective
bargaining agreement. "For example, the court should first look to
the explicit language of the collective bargaining agreement for clear
manifestations of intent." 2 The court must look to the context in
which the language arose, interpret each provision in question as
57. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Nolde Bros.,Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 430 U.S. 243 (1977) (TheCourt held that the employer was obliged to arbitrate disputes that had originally arisen
under the expired collective bargaining agreement.). For further discussion of the diffi-
culty of judicial ascertainment of the intent of the parties, see Weckstein, supra note 14
at 119-27.
58. 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984). For other
representative Sixth Circuit decisions construing the terms of collective bargaining agree-
ments to determine the intended duration of union retirees' welfare benefits, see Policy v.Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1202(1986); Upholsterers' Int'l Union v. American Pad and Textile Co., 372 F.2d 427 (6thCir. 1967); Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1985).
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part of the integrated whole, and avoid rendering terms nugatory or
illusory.63 Throughout the process, the court must review its inter-
pretation to ensure it does "not denigrate or contradict basic princi-
ples of federal labor law."6" Applying these governing principles to
the facts of the case, the Sixth Circuit concluded "the parties in-
tended to create nonterminating lifelong insurance benefits for the
Yard-Man retirees."6 5 Dispositive particular factors were considered
by the court. The contract language limiting benefits to "employees"
was found not applicable to "retirees"; the limitation of health insur-
ance coverage for the spouse and dependent children in the event of
the retiree's death "was meant as an exception to the anticipated
continuation of benefits beyond the life of the collective bargaining
agreement"; the employer paid the insurance of those who took early
retirement from age fifty-five to sixty-five; there were other "specific
durational limitations in other provisions of the current collective
bargaining agreement, suggest[ing] that retiree benefits, not so spe-
cifically limited, were intended to survive the expiration of successive
agreements in the parties' contemplated long-term relationship." 66
The court of appeals then considered a crucial conceptual issue at
the heart of all of these cases, namely, whether the retirees had a
"vested" right to continued benefits. In this case, the issue was re-
solved in the affirmative; "it is unlikely that such benefits, which are
typically understood as a form of delayed compensation or reward
for past services, would be left to the contingencies of future negotia-
tions."67 The court concluded that "the finding of an intent to create
interminable rights to retiree insurance benefits in the absence of ex-
plicit language, is not, in any discernible way, inconsistent with fed-
eral labor law." 68 The union also is bound by the vested nature of
the retiree benefits. Relying on Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the court
summarized the union's duty regarding these vested retiree benefits:
Clearly, the union may choose to forego such benefits in future negotiations
in favor of more immediate compensation. It may not, however, bargain
away retiree benefits which have already vested in particular individuals.
Such rights, once vested upon the employee's retirement, are interminable
and the employer's failure to provide them actionable under 1 301 by the
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1480.
65. Id; see also Century Brass Prod., Inc. v. United Auto Workers, 795 F.2d 265,
269 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 433 (1986) ("We assume ... that the benefits
were of lifetime duration.").
66. 716 F.2d at 1481-82.
67. Id. at 1482.
68. Id.
retiree.69
The court further bolstered this important vested rights analysis;
"retiree benefits are in a sense 'status' benefits which, as such, carry
with them an inference that they continue so long as the prerequisite
status retirement is maintained. ' '7 0 The court qualified its explana-
tion of "status" benefits, as a contingent support, once there has
been a determination that the retiree benefits are vested. 71 The
"vested" and "status" benefits analyses thus form a powerful positive
synergy. However, standing alone, the status benefit theory would beinsufficient to create nonterminable benefits, because retiree benefits
are not legally presumed inherently interminable. The court's con-
struction of the particular collective bargaining agreement supported
the judicial inference of the parties' intent that the retirees' insur-
ance "status" benefits were vested and interminable in this case.
Yard-Man is an obviously significant case, seriously dealing with
the difficult conceptual analysis of whether benefits are vested andinterminable, supplemented by the "status" benefit analysis. This
case encapsulates the pivotal conceptual inquiry that the courts must
conduct in all such cases, and helpfully suggests appropriate generalguidelines to structure this analysis. Ultimately, however, the specific
resolution in each particular situation will be fact-contingent, deter-
mined primarily by the parties' intent through the pertinent provi-
sions of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Sixth Circuit extensively relied on its influential Yard-Mandecision one year later in United Auto Workers v. Cadillac Mallea-
ble Iron Co.7 2 Employing Yard-Man principles, the Sixth Circuit
again concluded that, based on the particular facts, the retirees' in-
surance benefits continued for their lifetime and could not be termi-
nated by the employer upon the expiration of the collective bargain-
ing agreement under which the right to the benefits was acquired. 73
The parties intended that the benefits were payable for the retirees'lifetime, bolstered by "the inherent duration of the retirement status
beyond any particular contract.' The court of appeals did, how-
ever, accept the employer's argument that the district court errone-
ously "reversed the burden of proof by applying a presumption that
retirement benefits are vested for life in the absence of an explicit
showing of a contrary intent."7 5 The Sixth Circuit nevertheless af-
firmed the lower court's decision in favor of the retirees' continued
69. Id. at 1482 n.8; see also supra note 63.
70. 716 F.2d at 1482.
71. Id.
72. 728 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1984).
73. Id. at 809.
74. Id. at 808.
75. Id.
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benefits. Based on the particular facts, the parties were deemed to
have intended that the retirees' insurance benefits were not affected
by the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, al-
though the court of appeals rejected any lifetime presumption, its
heavy and express reliance on Yard-Man strongly indicated a judi-
cial disposition to construe retiree benefits grounded in collective
bargaining agreements in a fashion most beneficial to the retirees.
In Local Union No. i50-A, United Food and Commercial Work-
ers v. Dubuque Packing Co.,7 6 the Eighth Circuit borrowed heavily
from the important conceptual guidelines developed in these prior
Sixth Circuit cases. In Dubuque, an arbitrator held that current em-
ployees had vested health and welfare benefits. The union then
sought to have this arbitration decision applied to all retirees, includ-
ing those who had retired before the effective date of the current
collective bargaining agreement. The district court found for the
union, holding that both current employees and retirees were pro-
tected. Affirming the district court, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that it could not hold that the retirees' benefits were negotiated out
of the agreement. Again, judicial discernment of the intent of the
parties through the prism of the collective bargaining agreement was
at the heart of the inquiry.
Given the particular facts, the court of appeals in Dubuque con-
cluded that the plaintiffs carried their burden of proof and showed
that "the parties intended retirees' benefits would be vested and not
tied to the agreement which created them. '17 The court emphasized
that the rights arose from the retirees' "status" as past employees,
and were not dependent on a continued or current relationship with
the employer. In addition to the Eighth Circuit's use of the Sixth
Circuit's "status" theory, there was no evidence that the parties "did
not intend to vest the right to benefits in the retirees."79 Again, de-
spite the subtle conceptual issues, such as vested or status benefits, at
its core "the dispute is simply one of contract interpretation."'80
There are, however, several other cases holding in favor of the em-
ployer's termination of the retirees' health benefits in the context of
the collective bargaining agreement. Again, the judicial ascertain-
ment of the intent of the parties in the labor contract's express or
76. 756 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985).
77. "We must examine the intent of the parties to determine whether the health
and welfare benefits terminated at the expiration of each agreement." Id. at 69.
78. Id. at 70.
79. Id.
80. Id.
implied terms was the essential inquiry.
In Turner v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,81 for exam-
ple, the Ninth Circuit held that the retirees had no vested contrac-
tual right to continued health and welfare benefits. The successive
bargaining agreements demonstrated that the benefits in this situa-
tion were not vested.82 Therefore, they could be lawfully terminated
at the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 83 The Ninth
Circuit summarized:
None of the documents establishing the health and welfare benefits made
any representation as to the length of the period during which these benefits
would continue to be paid, other than 'throughout the term of this agree-
ment.' Under the express provisions of the trust agreement the trustees had
the right in their discretion to decrease the benefits. 4
United Auto Workers v. Roblin Industries, Inc.,85 conceptually
analogous to Yard-Man, reached the opposite conclusion. The partiesdid not intend to confer lifetime insurance benefits for retirees fol-
lowing expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. The court
opined that the labor contract did not guarantee the continuance of
the parties' labor relationship.86 Therefore, the court deemed that
the rights conferred under the labor contract did not survive its expi-
ration, because the contract did not expressly provide for the contin-
uance of contractual benefits beyond its term. The court refused topresume continuing benefits. Because the parties did not agree or
intend to grant lifetime benefits to the retirees, the court was without
any power to impose such an obligation on the employer.
The Roblin Industries court noted the important distinction be-
tween federal labor policy under the NLRA and federal pension pol-icy under ERISA.88 Rejecting the contention that federal labor pol-
icy mandated an implied obligation that retiree insurance benefits
survived the term of the collective bargaining agreement, the court
noted that this presumption of survivability existed only with regard
to pensions under ERISA, and not to retiree health and life insur-
ance benefits.8 9 Again, as in the pertinent cases previously discussed,judicial ascertainment of the intent of the parties in the context of
the language and spirit of the collective bargaining agreement was
most important. Therefore, in this case, the court was "unable tofind that the parties ever agreed on or intended to grant lifetime
81. 604 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979).
82. Id. at 1225.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 561 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
86. Id. at 298.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 299-300.
89. Id. at 300.
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insurance benefits for retirees and [iln the absence of such in-
tent or agreement . . . , [was] unable to impose such an uncontem-
plated obligation upon defendant Roblin."9"
The Status of Retiree Benefits in the Absence of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement
Less than twenty percent of the work force is unionized.9 1 There-
fore, obviously, many cases regarding the employer's termination of
retiree insurance benefits occur in the absence of any collective bar-
gaining agreement.
The most recent pertinent pre-COBRA case was decided by the
Sixth Circuit on August 25, 1986, in Gentile v. Youngstown Steel
Door Co.9 2 When the employer modified the health and life insur-
ance plans of nonunion retirees, requiring retirees to pay part of
their individual premiums,93 the plaintiff in Gentile alleged both
breach of contract and ERISA violations. The district court con-
cluded that the employer retained the right to modify its insurance
plans.94 The lower court first reasoned that the employer could uni-
laterally modify the health benefits of the union-represented hourly
retirees.9 5 The salaried, unrepresented retirees historically had been
treated identically to the union-represented retirees by the employer,
regarding benefits status. Therefore, since the employer could modify
the benefits of the union-represented retirees, the district court held
that the employer could likewise unilaterally change the benefits of
the unrepresented retirees.96
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's analysis that
found an implied-in-fact contract between the employer and its sala-
ried retirees under the labor contract.9 7 The court of appeals deter-
mined that the district court had erred by improperly transforming a
course of conduct into an implied-in-fact contract. Instead, the court
90. Id. at 301.
91. Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The Wagner Act at Fifty, 23 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 1, 3 (1986).
92. No. 84-3648, slip op. (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 1986) (Pursuant to Sixth Circuit
Rule 24 this decision is without a published opinion. 802 F.2d 457) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, USApp file).
93. "Under the new life insurance plan, retirees over the age of sixty-five pay 50%
of their insurance premiums, while retirees under the age of sixty-five pay 30% of their





of appeals rejected the lower court's equation of union and nonunion
retirees' status.9 8 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the employer's
policy of "maintaining rough equality of benefits between salaried
and hourly employees, without more, is too indefinite to create an
implied-in-fact contract between the company and its salaried retir-
ees." 9 Therefore, in the absence of any implied contract, the court
of appeals mandated that the case instead must be resolved without
the fallacious judicial equation of the status of the benefits of union-
ized and nonunionized retirees. Having distinguished the benefit sta-
tus of the nonunionized retirees from those of the unionized retirees,
the Sixth Circuit remanded Gentile for a thorough Yard-Man analy-
sis. The court of appeals expressly noted that, "on remand, the court
must focus on the plan documents which were distributed to the re-
tirees while they were active employees to determine the terms of
their contract with the company."100 The district court previously
had failed to scrutinize these documents with sufficient care.
Thus, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement
as in Yard-Man, or the absence of a labor contract as in Gentile, thejudicial resolution of the status of retiree health benefits and the em-
ployer's ability to modify those benefits hinge upon judicial interpre-
tation of documents pertinent to the benefits to ascertain the intent
of the parties.
In Eardman v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation Employee Welfare
Benefit Plans,10 1 the issue was again resolved by recourse to the plan
documents. The employer contended that it reserved the right to re-
duce. the pensioners' health care coverage and to require retiree pay-
ment of contributions.0 There was no specific language in the pro-
gram booklets, such as "vested," "nonforfeitable," or "for life," to
create any lifetime expectation or entitlement to health care benefits.
The employer therefore alleged that the absence of any such lan-
guage evidenced the parties' intent that the employer retained termi-
nation rights. However, the court rejected the employer's rationale.
The court deemed that the employer's specification of explicit events,
such as loss of citizenship or remarriage, that terminated retiree ben-
efits also operated to render the benefits otherwise immune from em-
ployer modification.103 Citing the Sixth Circuit's influential Yard-
Man decision, the court in Eardman reiterated that "retiree benefits
are in a sense 'status' benefits which, as such, carry with them an




101. 607 F. Supp. 196 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
102. Id. at 198.
103. Id. at 214.
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maintained.' 04 Although the implication of uninterrupted status
benefits was alone insufficient, it combined with the particular facts
in Eardman to sustain the plaintiff's argument that the retiree
health insurance benefits here were generally not unilaterally termi-
nable by the employer.1
0 5
In its recent April 1986 decision in White Farm Equipment Co. v.
White Motor Corp.,0 6 the Sixth Circuit again led the way. Just as it
had in the important Yard-Man line of cases, where the court first
elucidated the operative standards to guide the lower courts in
resolving problems of employer termination of retiree health insur-
ance benefits in the context of labor contracts, the White Farm court
now examined "serious questions concerning the attempted termina-
tion of certain insurance benefits under a welfare benefit plan for
retired employees by an employer in the process of reorganization in
bankruptcy.' 07 Significantly, and unlike the Yard-Man line of cases,
the benefits in question in White Farm were not the subject of any
labor contract. Instead, ERISA was the operative standard by which
the court was to measure the employer's conduct and the retirees'
rights, if any, to unimpeded, uninterrupted benefits.
Plaintiffs were former employees and spouses of deceased former
employees. Claiming that their welfare benefits were vested and
nonterminable, they sued White Farm, their former employer. The
White Farm Insurance Plan for Salaried Employees was a
nonfunded, noncontributory welfare benefit plan. It had provided
life, health and welfare insurance, prescription drugs, dental care,
and hearing aid benefits to retirees and their eligible dependents.
Formed by a merger in 1969, White Farm had been engaged in
the manufacture and distribution of farm and material handling
equipment. In April 1980 the company suspended its manufacturing
operation, given poor sales and insufficient working capital. In Sep-
tember 1980 the employer voluntarily petitioned for reorganization
under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The bank-
ruptcy court approved a December 1980 sale of White Farm by
White Motor to White Farm U.S.A., Inc., a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of the TIC Investment Company. White Farm assumed White
Motor's obligations to employees and retirees under the welfare ben-
efit plan. Simultaneously, White Farm's president sent a letter to
104. Id.
105. Id. at 215.
106. 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986).
107. Id. at 1187.
retirees, and advised them that their "retirement benefits will con-
tinue." 108 After funding benefits for the next few months, White
Farm notified retirees that the plan would be discontinued May 1,
1981, and that retirees could thereafter obtain identical coverage on
a fully contributory basis at group rates.10 9
The only documentary evidence of the terms of the retiree insur-
ance benefit plan were summary booklets from 1970 and 1978 issued
to retirees and employees and describing the plan. No formal plan
document could be found or produced. Among the explicit language
favoring the employer's unilateral right to abrogate the plans
and the benefits thereunder, the booklets prominently stated that
"your insurance terminates when . . . the group policy terminates
;,,'Io and "the Company does reserve the right to change the
plans, and, if necessary, discontinue them." '
The bankruptcy court found for the employer-defendant's right to
terminate the plan,112 because of the above "unambiguous" language
establishing the employer's unqualified right to amend or terminate
the plan and the benefits.113 The bankruptcy court rejected the plain-
tiffs' argument that the courts adopt as "federal common law" a pre-
ERISA Ohio state law "which precluded the termination of retiree
benefits as having 'vested' at retirement, notwithstanding a reserved
contractual power of termination to the contrary."1 1' The bank-
ruptcy court consequently found that there was no breach of any
ERISA fiduciary duty by the employer changing the plan from one
of complete employer funding to one of full contribution by the
participants.
The district court reversed, and held that the termination of the
welfare benefit plan violated ERISA under federal common-law
principles. 1 5 The federal district court relied on the Ohio state law
urged by the plaintiffs, because ERISA was silent. The district court
concluded that the welfare benefits vested upon retirement and could
not be terminated, despite the unambiguous and explicit reservation
of such right by the employer in the clear language of the pertinent
plan documents. 116 The district court in Whfte Farm, by establishing
a policy of interminable, vested rights in the face of express language
to the contrary, did precisely what the Sixth Circuit refused to do in
the Yard-Man line of cases under collective bargaining agreements.
108. Id. at 1188.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1189.
112. 23 Bankr. 85 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
113. White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1189.
114. Id.
115. 42 Bankr. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
116. Id. at 1020-21.
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The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, and remanded the
case to the bankruptcy court.117 The court of appeals decided that
"under ERISA an employer may lawfully exercise a reserved power
to terminate an employee welfare benefit plan for retired nonunion
employees."'1 8 The appellate court rejected the notion of any ERISA
federal common law that could override the clear terms of the plan
documents, expressly reserving employer rights to terminate the
plan." 9 Therefore, the court could not automatically vest an intermi-
nable right to benefits, regardless of contract terms.
The bankruptcy, district, and appellate courts all agreed that the
plan at issue was certainly an employee welfare benefit plan as de-
fined by ERISA. 20 Because of ERISA's broad preemption clause,
12
'
Congress intended that regulation of ERISA employee welfare bene-
fit plans be governed exclusively by federal law, even if ERISA is
otherwise substantively silent."2 Therefore, the Ohio state law was
unequivocally preempted by ERISA in this case. The Sixth Circuit
concluded that, despite the statutory silence of ERISA on this spe-
cific issue of the employer's reserved right to terminate the plan,
ERISA "counsels against the imposition by this court of an absolute
rule effectively requiring mandatory vesting at retirement of retiree
welfare benefits under these circumstances.' 23 Thus, in accord with
several other decisions,2 the court stressed the congressionally rec-
ognized difference between ERISA welfare benefit plans and ERISA
pension plans. Only the latter are presumed to vest and to be inter-
minable. Therefore, the parties may reserve the right to terminate or
modify welfare benefit plans. The court of appeals summarized:
Congress expressly exempted employee welfare benefit plans from stringent
vesting, participation, and funding requirements. Congress recognized the
differences between welfare benefit plans and pension plans, and we discern
no basis for finding mandatory vesting in ERISA of retiree welfare benefits.
We believe that the legislature, rather than the courts, should determine
whether mandatory vesting of retiree welfare benefits is appropriate.12 5
Ultimately, whether in the labor contract or nonlabor contract/
117. White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1190.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1193.
120. Id. at 1191-92. See 29 U.S.C. § 1101(1), (3) (1982).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982). For comprehensive analysis of ERISA preemption
of state law, see Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in
Effective Federalism, 48 U. PIn. L. REV. (forthcoming, 1987).
122. White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1191.
123. Id. at 1193.
124. Id.
125. Id.
ERISA/bankruptcy context, the court's fundamental task, in deter-
mining whether the employer can, or cannot, modify or terminate
retiree health insurance benefits, is to assess all pertinent documents
to ascertain the intent and understanding of the parties. The judicial
ascertainment of the parties' intent in both the labor contract and
ERISA context is quite analogous. The Sixth Circuit expressly eluci-
dated this afialogy in White Farm:
We conclude, moreover, that the parties may themselves set out by agree-
ment or by private design, as set out in plan documents, whether retiree
welfare benefits vest, or whether they may be terminated. In construing
such agreements, courts may draw inferences or make presumptions as this
court has done in construing collective bargaining agreements providing
welfare benefit plans.126
CONCLUSION
In 1986 Congress took an important and long overdue first step
toward providing meaningful statutory protections for retiree health
insurance benefits. In the absence of any private contractual protec-
tions, COBRA now provides most retirees the opportunity to con-
tinue participation in the employer's group health insurance plan for
at least eighteen months following retirement. The case law in the
various circuits provided no certainty of judicial protection for such
benefits. Whether or not a labor contract was present, the intent of
the parties, expressed within or inferred from pertinent documents,
governed the judicial resolution of whether the benefits are vested
and interminable, or terminable at the unilateral discretion of the
employer. Thus, the courts honored the established labor law policy
of not imposing substantive terms upon employers and employees.127
In retiree health insurance cases, the courts confined their role to
interpreting the pertinent documents to ascertain the intent of the
parties, if the written terms were not clearly dispositive. If the em-
ployer carefully drafted the plan documents and successfully resisted
union efforts to negotiate vested, nonterminable benefits on behalf of
its retired constituency, the courts generally sustained the employer's
prerogative to modify or to terminate retiree benefits at the em-
ployer's unilateral discretion. The case law left the protection of re-
tiree benefits to the relative negotiation and collective bargaining
strength of labor and employers in the unionized environment. In the
nonunionized setting, with the employees unable to exert collective
leverage, the status and continuance of employer-paid health insur-
ance benefits upon retirement was unilaterally governed by the em-
ployer. Thus, given the courts' narrow reading of the pertinent docu-
ments, and refusal to inject broader public policy considerations to
126. Id.
127. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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alleviate employer dominance in unilaterally setting and modifying
the terms of the post-employment relationship, the "intent" of the
parties was usually tantamount to the "intent" of only the employer.
Case law construction, according to traditional contract law and la-
bor law policy norms, prohibiting substantive judicial interference
with the terms of the employment relationship, can be dysfunctional;
in these cases, it did not provide coherent, broad protections for con-
tinuance of employer-paid retiree health insurance benefits. With the
benefit of some case law, employers were able to refine benefit plan
language to reserve the unfettered right to terminate benefits.
The case law painfully obviated the pressing need for rational leg-
islation to remedy the legal limbo to which retiree benefits were con-
signed. COBRA, a modest initial effort toward a meaningful statu-
tory protection, unfortunately is perhaps more significant for what it
fails to address than for the limited protections it does provide.
Under COBRA, the retiree's "protection" consists of paying the
complete cost of the premium, plus a two percent surcharge, in order
to retain participation in the employer's preferential lower group rate
for the first eighteen months of retirement. However, after the first
eighteen months of retirement elapse, the retiree has no further stat-
utory right to participate in the plan. For many retirees, the average
$2000 annual premium for family health insurance or the $1000 rate
for the individual under the group plan is already prohibitively ex-
pensive. When deprived of group participation after eighteen months
of retirement and unable to pay the nongroup rate premium, the re-
tiree without insurance is placed at high risk of personal bankruptcy
by a single serious illness. This risk problem is exacerbated by the
increased health problems associated with advancing age. If the em-
ployer completely terminates the health insurance for all employees
and retirees, COBRA specifically exempts such draconian employer
action from the statute. COBRA endorses the employer's common
tactic in business reorganization or liquidation to terminate health
insurance plans to effect significant cost savings.128 With most health
128. For recent examples of complete termination of retiree health insurance plans
at the commencement of employer bankruptcy proceedings, see Greenhouse, Health
Plans Are Feeling A Little Peaked, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1986, at 5, ol. 3:
Robert Haley said he panicked when the LTV Corporation, the giant [nation's
second largest] steelmaker, filed for protection under Federal bankruptcy laws
last month and cut off health benefits for 78,000 retired employees. Mr. Haley,
who worked 31 years in LTV's Indiana Harbor mill south of Chicago, immedi-
ately postponed a double hernia operation because he said he could not afford
it without insurance.
However, prompted by the recent LTV bankruptcy, a Senate bill was introduced in
insurance liability unfunded, and without any ERISA requirement
that such employee welfare benefit plans be funded, it increasingly
will be in the employer's interest to terminate such plans completely,
stranding retirees without legal protections at an economically vul-
nerable period of their lives, just as their health care costs begin to
skyrocket. If anything, the convergence of narrow case law and mini-
mal statutory law in 1986 highlights the pressing and continuing
need to enact meaningful statutory protections for nonterminable
comprehensive retiree health insurance at low or no cost to the re-
tiree for the balance of retirement. The retirement and health care
systems of most other major Western nations disgrace the paltry de
minimus statutory support for retired workers in the United States.
Other nations have shown that labor and employment law can
powerfully protect fundamental human dignity.1 29 COBRA indicates
that Congress has finally appreciated the compelling need to protect
the health care insurance of retirees. One cautiously hopes that, even
in this era of federal fiscal crisis, COBRA will be only the first step
toward comprehensive statutory protections.
July, 1986, which would prohibit LTV, which filed for bankruptcy, from discontinuing
medical and life insurance benefits to retirees. S. 2690, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
For pertinent 11 U.S.C. § 1113 case law regarding employer termination of retiree
benefits in bankruptcy, immediately prior to COBRA, see Century Brass Prod., Inc. v.
United Auto Workers, 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 433 (1986):
The bankruptcy and district courts both found that the debtor's proposal to the
union to eliminate vested retiree benefits did not constitute a sufficient basis to
prevent the debtor from rejecting the labor agreement under § 1113. We agree
that vested retiree insurance benefits are a proper subject of bargaining. But
since a conflict of interest between active employees and retirees precludes the
union from representing both, we remand the case to the bankruptcy court so
that it can appoint a representative for the retirees in these negotiations.
Id. at 267; see also In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 Bankr. 797 (W.D. Kent. 1985):[T]he main reason behind the union's rejection of the debtor's proposal appar-
ently was due to a policy determination that the union could not voluntarily
negotiate away the medical coverage provided by its Health and Pension Fund,
an entity related to the union. While this is not an unreasonable basis for re-jecting the debtor's proposal, it does not constitute "good cause" within the
meaning of section 1113(c)(2).
Id. at 805.
129. For example, in Great Britain, section 35 of the Employment Protection Act
provides that a woman absent from work due to pregnancy is entitled to maternity pay
for up to six weeks, with a right to return to work. See W.B. CREIGHTON, WORKING
WOMEN AND THE LAW (1979). Great Britain also provides the Industrial Tribunal sys-
tem to hear the discharge claims for almost all dismissed employees, with near-universal
monetary awards and occasional reinstatement as remedies. See Rico, Legislating
Against Unfair Dismissal Implications From British Experience, 8 IND. REL. L.J. 547
(1986). For further discussion of possible future legislation in the United States, see
Weckstein, supra note 14 at 134-36.
